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Opportunity in a Pandemic:
Ending the Eviction Cycle by Constitutionally
Providing for Inclusionary Zoning with
State-Enacted Land-Use Regulations
ABSTRACT
Evictions invite instability into every aspect of daily life. Children are
uprooted from schools because their parents are no longer able to rent a
home in the school district. Parents are fired from jobs because they take
days off to find patchwork solutions to avoid homelessness. COVID-19
forced the public to become aware of many social issues, including the
harsh reality of evictions. With the end of the pandemic is in sight, the
impact of evictions cannot be forgotten. Action must be taken to ensure
stable housing for generations to come. Broadening a state’s general
zoning power to explicitly include affordable housing is the proper
solution. This Comment explores the legal history of inclusionary zoning
and provides model language to local governments for the constitutional
implementation of such policies that ensure private developers receive a
reciprocal benefit for their role in providing affordable
housing. Constitutionally providing for inclusionary zoning is an important
step towards ending the eviction cycle in many states, especially in North
Carolina.
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INTRODUCTION
In March 2020, the United States entered one of the largest pandemics
in its history. As of April 2021, roughly 30 million cases of COVID-19
were confirmed in the United States.1 More than 549,000 individuals lost
their lives.2 At the state and federal level, leaders were forced to
acknowledge the economic effect of the pandemic and rapidly respond to
assist the most vulnerable populations. As a result, evictions came to the
forefront of national and state policy. On March 27, 2020, President Trump
signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act
(CARES ACT). In part, the CARES Act imposed a moratorium3 on

1. CDC COVID Data Tracker, United States COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by State,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html [https://perma.cc/LZ9Z-2PDA].
2. Id.
3. A moratorium is “a legally authorized period of delay in the performance of a legal
obligation or the payment of a debt.” Moratorium, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merr
iam-webster.com/dictionary/moratorium [https://perma.cc/433D-E94H].
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evictions for tenants living in housing assisted by federal dollars.4 North
Carolina Governor Cooper and North Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice
Beasley responded to the CARES Act by enacting a statewide moratorium
on evictions and prohibiting summary ejectment proceedings.5 Eviction
filings for the nonpayment of rent resumed in North Carolina from June 21
to September 1, 2020.6 These filings came to a halt on September 1, 2020,
when, in a historic show of authority, the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) issued a declaration stopping all evictions for
nonpayment of rent until December 31, 2020, if the tenant met certain
criteria.7 Governor Cooper issued Executive Order 171 solidifying the
protections provided by the CDC declaration and imposing a duty on
landlords to provide information about the declaration to tenants.8
As these moratoria lift, the spotlight is fading on vulnerable
populations. The issue of housing stability in North Carolina, however,
must remain center stage. In 2016, approximately 171 evictions occurred
each day in North Carolina.9 Greensboro, North Carolina, has the seventh
4. Nat’l Hous. L. Project, Summary and Analysis of Federal CARES Act Eviction
Moratorium (2020), https://www.nhlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020.03.27-NHLP-CARESAct-Eviction-Moratorium-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/FGT5-384S].
5. Order of the Chief Justice of the N.C. Supreme Court, Emergency Directive 17–19
(2020) [hereinafter Emergency Directive 17–19] (staying all eviction proceedings until June
21, 2020); N.C. Exec. Order No. 142 (May 30, 2020), https://files.nc.gov/governor
/documents/files/EO142-Temp-Prohibitions-on-Evictions-and-Extending-Prohibition-onUtility-Shut-Offs.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7K5-F7XV] (imposing a moratorium on evictions
between May 30, 2020, and June 21, 2020, and prohibiting landlords from pursuing summary
ejectment proceedings and assessing fees for late rent payment). A summary ejectment
proceeding is “an action by a landlord asking the court to terminate the lease of a breaching
tenant and award possession to the landlord.” Dona Lewandowski, A Judgment for
Possession Is Only Step 1 in Summary Ejectment Cases, ON THE CIVIL SIDE: A UNC SCH. OF
GOV’T BLOG (May 31, 2018, 2:43 PM), https://civil.sog.unc.edu/a-judgment-for-possessionis-only-step-1-in-summary-ejectment-cases/ [https://perma.cc/9V5X-JAVL].
6. Ben Sessoms, Thousands of NC Residents at Risk of Eviction as Rent Payment
Protections Expire, NEWS & OBSERVER (Aug. 23, 2020, 10:05 AM),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/coronavirus/article244880452.html [https://perma.cc
/67YV-29A2].
7. Lauren Lindstrom & Ben Sessoms, CDC Halts Evictions, But Advocates Say More
Relief Needed to Avoid Rent ‘Cliff,’ CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Sept. 3, 2020, 4:46 PM),
https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/coronavirus/article245440790.html [https://perm
a.cc/K9A9-UZY5].
8. N.C. Exec. Order No. 171 (Oct. 28. 2020), https://files.nc.gov/governor/documents/
files/EO171-Assisting-North-Carolinians-At-Risk-of-Eviction.pdf [https://perma.cc/WU5D
-HDQM].
9. Eviction Rate: North Carolina, EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/map/#/2016?g
eography=states&bounds=-178.743,26.577,-56.882,69.69&type=er&locations=37,79.354,35.534 [https://perma.cc/6TQ8-UQHE]. Roughly 2.3 million evictions were filed in
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highest rate of evictions in the country.10 Each court filing and subsequent
eviction places vulnerable populations further away from stable homes.11
Without this stability, it is more difficult for parents to maintain
employment, children to focus on education, and families to participate in
their communities. Before the spotlight goes out, the time is now to ensure
stable housing for low-income families for decades to come.
This Comment argues that an inclusionary zoning policy12 that
incorporates alternative means to provide for affordable housing with a
reciprocal benefit to private developers is a constitutional solution to
address housing insecurity.13 In particular, this Comment analyzes the
constitutionality of monetary exactions as a component of inclusionary
zoning policies. North Carolina, unlike home-rule14 states, permits cities
and counties to enact only local regulations that are clearly authorized by
state legislation.15 State legislation does not provide an explicit power for
cities or counties to enact inclusionary zoning policies.16 Acting on implicit
authority granted under a general zoning power,17 the towns of Davidson,

the United States in 2016. Terry Gross, First-Ever Evictions Database Shows: ‘We’re in the
Middle of a Housing Crisis,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 12, 2018, 1:07 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/12/601783346/first-ever-evictions-database-shows-were-inthe-middle-of-a-housing-crisis [https://perma.cc/V72R-DZUP].
10. Eviction Rankings, EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/rankings/#/evictions?r=U
nited%20States&a=0&d=evictionRate&lang=en [https://perma.cc/DD6W-ZS85].
11. See MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
252 (2017) (“Eviction itself often explained why some families lived on safe streets and
others on dangerous ones, why some children attended good schools and others failing
ones.”).
12. Inclusionary zoning policies are “local policies that tap the economic gains from
rising real estate values to create affordable housing for lower income families.” What is
Inclusionary Housing?, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING, https://inclusionaryhousing.org/inclusiona
ry-housing-explained/what-is-inclusionary-housing/ [https://perma.cc/V9ES-LAF9].
13. See, e.g., Joe Marusak, Developers Sue Davidson Over Affordable-Housing
Mandate, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Oct. 22, 2014, 5:04 PM), https://www.charlotteobserver.c
om/news/local/article9204884.html [https://perma.cc/N684-JZYC].
14. “Under home rule, a county or municipality can do anything that’s not specifically
denied by the state constitution, the General Assembly, or the charter itself.” Kate Lao
Shaffner, What is Home Rule?, WHYY (July 24, 2014), https://whyy.org/articles/what-ishome-rule/ [https://perma.cc/X9RG-FRFW].
15. Matthew Norchi, Affordable Housing Toolkit Snapshot: Inclusionary Zoning,
ANGLES FROM THE CAROLINA PLAN. J. (Feb. 20, 2018), https://carolinaangles.com/2018/02/
20/affordable-housing-toolkit-inclusionary-zoning/ [https://perma.cc/LQ4G-FYSR].
See infra Part III for proposed statutory language.
16. See N.C. Gᴇɴ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 160A-381 (2019), 153A-340 (2019).
17. A county or city may not take a particular action “unless and until the legislature
grants such authority.” Bowen C. Houff, North Carolina Legislature Revamps Zoning
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Chapel Hill, and Manteo developed inclusionary zoning policies that
provide for affordable housing.18 However, without clear guidance from
the North Carolina General Assembly, municipalities are hesitant to enact
inclusionary zoning policies out of a growing concern that doing so may
raise a constitutional challenge.
At the federal level, in December 2019, the United States Supreme
Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari to hear Cherk v. County of
Marin, a case that addresses the constitutionality of monetary exactions
within inclusionary zoning policies.19 By denying certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court signaled that this is an issue for the states to resolve.20
Resolution of this issue is difficult because the United States Supreme Court
takes a divided stance on whether a monetary exaction imposes an
impermissible restriction on an owner’s use rights. This divide is explained
in Koontz v. Saint Johns River Water Management District.21 The dissent,
written by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor, properly distinguished an unconstitutional taking from a
monetary exaction.22 Acknowledging that a monetary exaction does not
deprive an owner of any property interest, the dissent challenged the
majority’s interpretation that the exaction required an analysis under the
“nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests established in Nollan and
Dolan.23 This divide leaves many states to wonder: What is the appropriate
next step? The dissent’s analysis in Koontz is the appropriate next step to
Regulation Statutes, BLANCO TACKABERY, https://www.blancolaw.com/north-carolinalegislature-revamps-zoning-regulation-statutes/ [https://perma.cc/2SQR-CY3N].
18. Marusak, supra note 13.
19. Cherk v. Cnty. of Marin, No. 18-1538, 2018 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8454, *1 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 652 (2019). The Cherks applied for a permit
to divide a vacant 2.9-acre parcel of land into two single-family residential lots. Id. The
permit was subject to an in-lieu fee to the County for affordable housing projects. Id.
Approval of the Cherk’s permit was conditioned on the payment of a $39,960 fee. Id.
20. Monetary exactions are an important power for local governments to solve various
social issues, such as providing for affordable housing. Exactions and Impact Fees, UNIV.
OF FLA. LEVINE COLL. OF L., https://www.law.ufl.edu/_pdf/academics/centers-clinics/clinics
/conservation/resources/exactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UT4-FNV2] (“Exactions are
burdens or requirements a local government places on a developer to dedicate land or
construct or pay for all or a portion of the costs of capital improvements needed for public
facilities as a condition of development approval.”).
21. 570 U.S. 595 (2013).
22. Id. at 622–24 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 622 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). Cherk asserted that the
frameworks established in Nollan and Dolan were the proper analyses for all conditions on
building permits, including monetary exactions. Cherk, 2018 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS
8454, at *23–25.
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ensure inclusionary zoning remains a constitutional means to provide
affordable housing and to help low-income renters find the stability they
need.
Furthermore, an inclusionary zoning policy that requires a private
developer to allocate a set number of units for affordable housing or in lieu
of doing so pay an annual fee to support affordable housing projects
necessarily impacts private developers and their ability to do business. The
goal of inclusionary zoning policies is not to prevent or overly encumber
private development. Rather, the goal is to provide reciprocal benefits to
private developers in the form of tax benefits and density bonuses to ensure
the developer and those seeking affordable housing are equally benefited by
these policies. It is this shared benefit that further prevents constitutional
concerns.
Part I of this Comment provides the United States Supreme Court’s
progression to Koontz, including an analysis of the decisions in Nollan and
Dolan, and the impact of Penn Central on inclusionary zoning policies
moving forward. Part II analogizes the preservation of wetlands, at issue in
Koontz, to the need for affordable housing and provides a simple framework
to guide inclusionary zoning policies across the state. Part III proposes
statutory language to provide North Carolina with the opportunity to legally
encourage the private development of affordable housing at the local level.
I. THE PROGRESSION TO KOONTZ
Inclusionary zoning is typically enforced by a local ordinance that
utilizes “policies that tap the economic gains from rising real estate
values.”24 The development of a legal framework to assess the
constitutionality of inclusionary zoning began with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Village of Euclid, which marked the beginning of an important
thread of cases that defined zoning laws and local governments’ rights to
institute ordinances to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of the
community.25 The decisions that followed—Penn Central Transportation
Co., Loretto, Lucas, Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz—narrowed Euclid’s legacy
and developed an important foundation for analyzing inclusionary zoning.26

24. What is Inclusionary Housing?, supra note 12.
25. See generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
26. See generally Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595 (2013);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Village of Euclid established that municipalities are permitted to enact
zoning ordinances as an exercise of police power in order to support the
health, safety, and welfare of the community.27
Penn Central
Transportation Co. applied a three-part test to assess if and when a zoning
restriction results in a Fifth Amendment taking.28 Building on the holding
in Penn Central, the Supreme Court decided in Loretto that a taking, no
matter how small, is a taking if it excludes the property owner from any part
of her exclusive possession.29 The Supreme Court went on to hold in Lucas
that a restriction may have the power to render a parcel of land completely
valueless.30 Municipalities continued to place conditions precedent on land
use permits in order to gain easy access to public areas or decrease traffic
congestion.31 These conditions precedent were discussed in the Nollan and
Dolan decisions.32
Based on the precedent following Village of Euclid, land use regulation
is now defined by two analytical frameworks. The first was established in
Penn Central and was further defined by the holdings in Loretto and
Lucas.33 The second was established in Nollan and Dolan.34 Depending on
which framework is applied, inclusionary zoning, which imposes a
monetary exaction, may or may not be constitutional.35 This section
explains the distinctions in the frameworks and the proper application of
each.

27. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
28. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
29. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435–39.
30. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28.
31. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395.
32. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395.
33. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027–28; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435–39; Penn Cent. Transp. Co.,
438 U.S. at 124.
34. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395.
35. This Comment focuses on the adoption of inclusionary zoning policies that impose
a monetary exaction, or in the alternative, requires developers to provide a set number of
affordable housing units. In applying the Nollan and Dolan framework, the Supreme Court
in Koontz held that the monetary exaction imposed on the private landowner was a taking.
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 612 (2013). However, without
engaging in the analysis, the dissent argued that the monetary exaction may be permissive if
analyzed under the framework established in Penn Central. Id. at 629 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting). This section analyzes the holding in Koontz followed by the holdings in Nollan
and Dolan.
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A. The Legacy Left by Koontz
In 1972, Coy A. Koontz Jr. purchased 14.9 acres of undeveloped
wetlands in Florida.36 That same year, Florida enacted the Water Resources
Act (Act) authorizing water management districts (district) across the state
to regulate “construction that connects to, draws water from, drains water
into, or is placed in or across the waters in the state.”37 As a result of the
Act, landowners were required to obtain a permit that “may impose ‘such
reasonable conditions’ . . . as are ‘necessary to assure’ that construction will
‘not be harmful to the water resources of the district.’”38 In addition, the
Henderson Wetlands Protection Act required “permit applicants . . . to
provide ‘reasonable assurance’ that proposed construction on wetlands
[was] ‘not contrary to the public interest[.]’”39
Twenty-two years after purchasing his undeveloped land, Mr. Koontz
applied for the necessary permits to build on a portion of the parcel.40 At
the time of his application, he offered an eleven-acre conservation easement
on the land.41 The district determined that the easement failed to adequately
provide reasonable assurances for the protection of the wetlands in
Florida.42
Prior to approval, and to mitigate the harmful effects that his
development would have, the district proposed that Mr. Koontz reduce the
size of his development from 3.7 acres to one acre, or proceed with his
original plan, and deed a conservation easement on the remaining land.43
The district agreed that Mr. Koontz could move forward with the
development of 3.7 acres if he deeded the easement on his land and provided
monetary support to improve wetlands located elsewhere in the state.44 Mr.
Koontz found the district’s proposals excessive and filed suit.45
In Koontz v. Saint Johns River Water Management District, the
Supreme Court held that the monetary exactions affected Mr. Koontz’s
rights and, like conditions subsequent and precedent, required analysis
under the “nexus” and “rough proportionality” test established in Nollan

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Koontz, 570 U.S. at 599.
Id. at 600 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.403(5) (2010)).
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.413(1) (2010)).
Koontz, 570 U.S. at 601.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601–02.
Id.
Id. at 602.
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and Dolan.46 This decision was one of the first to hold that monetary
exactions may attach to a particular parcel in a way that deprives a
landowner of a property use right.47
In the five–four decision in Koontz, the dissent properly argued that
imposing a monetary exaction was not a Fifth Amendment taking and that
the application of Nollan and Dolan was unnecessary.48 The dissent went
on to appropriately distinguish Koontz from Nollan and Dolan, in that the
latter cases applied to unconstitutional conditions subsequent and precedent
to building permits that in effect deprived the owner of a use right, whereas
the facts in Koontz solely raised the issue of a monetary exaction.49 Justice
Kagan argued that monetary exactions are simply obligations “to perform
an act, the payment of benefits.”50 It is not a deprivation of a use right.51
She went on to say that the majority’s decision extends the complex issues
of Nollan and Dolan into local land-use regulation and services.52 As a
result, the Supreme Court decreased the states’ flexibility to take routine
actions, such as land-use regulation to enhance their communities.53 Before
applying the facts in Koontz to the analysis in the dissent’s opinion, it is
important to understand why the majority applied Nollan and Dolan.
B. A Perfect Fit? An Assessment of the Frameworks Established in
Nollan, Dolan, and Penn Central
In assessing whether a condition subsequent or precedent to the
approval of a land-use permit is constitutional, a court must apply the
“nexus” test established in Nollan and the “rough proportionality” test

46. Id. at 604–06, 612.
47. Id. at 623 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540–41
(1998)) (distinguishing between the appropriation of a specific property interest and the
imposition of an order to pay money).
48. Id. at 623–24 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 623 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[D]oes requiring a person to pay money to the
government, or spend money on its behalf, constitute a taking requiring just compensation?
Only if the answer is yes does the Nollan-Dolan test apply.”).
50. Id. at 624 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Apfel, 524 U.S. at 540); A.J. CASNER ET
AL., CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 1221, 1221–22 (5th ed. 2004) (noting that a monetary
exaction is a requirement imposed on a parcel of land for the developer to mitigate
anticipated negative impacts of the development).
51. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 623 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he law did not effect a taking
because it did not ‘operate upon or alter’ a ‘specific and identified propert[y] or property
right[.]’” (alterations in original) (quoting Apfel, 524 U.S. at 540–41)).
52. Id. at 620 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 626–27 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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established in Dolan. Both tests ensure that the condition imposed is
connected to a legitimate use of the state’s police power.
1. Conditions Subsequent or Precedent
The Nollan decision analyzed the “nexus” test for assessing the
constitutionality of conditions precedent to building permits.54 In Nollan, a
couple was required to obtain a coastal development permit from the
California Coastal Commission (Commission).55
The Commission
recommended that the permit be granted if the Nollans approved an
easement for public access to the adjacent beach.56 The Nollans argued that
“absent evidence that their proposed development would have a direct
adverse impact on public access to the beach,” the condition could not be
enforced.57 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the condition on the
Nollans’ building permit was a taking requiring just compensation.58 The
Court reasoned that there must be a nexus between the proposed condition
and the developmental ban.59 A nexus is the relationship between “the
condition [imposed] and the original purpose of the building restriction.”60
Therefore, a lawful land-use regulation must further the purported
governmental purposes.61 The Commission’s inability to assert a nexus
between the imposed condition and the original purpose of the building
restriction rendered the condition an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth
Amendment.62
Building on the holding in Nollan, the Dolan decision established the
“rough proportionality” test for assessing the constitutionality of conditions
precedent to building permits.63 The Oregon City Planning Commission
conditioned approval of a business owner’s application on her agreement to
dedicate a portion of the land for improvements to a storm drainage system,
a public greenway, and a pedestrian pathway.64 The purpose of the

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
Id. at 828.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 841–42.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 841–42.
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
Id. at 380.
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condition was to reduce flooding and relieve traffic congestion.65 Applying
the holding in Nollan, the Court stated:
In evaluating [Dolan’s] claim, we must first determine whether [an]
“essential nexus” exists between the “legitimate state interest” and the
permit condition enacted by the city . . . . If we find that a nexus exists, we
must then decide the required degree of connection between the exactions
and the projected impact of the proposed development.66

The Supreme Court held that “[u]ndoubtedly, the prevention of
flooding . . . and the reduction of traffic congestion . . . qualify as the type
of legitimate public purposes we have upheld.”67 Applying the “rough
proportionality” test, the Court analyzed whether the required dedication
was related in both nature and extent to the proposed development’s impact
and if the reasoning was constitutionally sufficient to justify the
conditions.68 The State failed to provide evidence that the requirement was
roughly proportional to the prevention of flooding and reducing traffic
congestion.69 The Court stated, “A strong public desire to improve the
public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the change.”70 Therefore, the Court
held that the risk for flooding or increased traffic congestion was not
roughly proportional to Dolan’s proposed construction.71
The issues in Nollan and Dolan apply to physical invasions on private
property.72 In contrast, the monetary exaction at issue in Koontz did not
present a physical invasion on private property.73 The Nollan and Dolan
frameworks “have no application when governments impose a general
financial obligation as part of the permitting process, because . . . such an
action does not otherwise trigger the Takings Clause’s protections.”74 The
65. Id.
66. Id. at 386 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837).
67. Id. at 387 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260–62 (1980)).
68. Id. at 388–91.
69. Id. at 394–95.
70. Id. at 396 (alteration in original) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416
(1922)).
71. Id. at 394–95.
72. See Nollan v. Cal. Costal Com’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393.
73. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 621 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
74. Id. at 630; see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 524 (1998) (noting that
retroactively requiring the petitioner to pay money for the medical benefits of its former
workers after it left the industry was controlled by well-settled due process principles).
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owner is not deprived of a use right.75 Instead, a monetary exaction is
merely an exercise of the local police power.76
2. Monetary Exactions
Because a monetary exaction does not deprive a landowner of her use
rights, the question becomes whether the law at issue exceeds the state’s
local police power to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of the
community. This question requires an analysis under the factor balancing
test discussed in Penn Central.77 The test includes three factors: (1)
economic impact, (2) investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character
of the governmental action.
In Penn Central, New York City enacted the Landmarks Preservation
Law (Preservation Law) to protect historic landmarks from “precipitate
decisions to destroy or fundamentally alter” the landmark’s character.78 The
Preservation Law was enforced by the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Commission (Preservation Commission). Penn Central
Transportation Company (Penn Central) sought approval from the
Preservation Commission for the construction of a fifty-story office
building over Grand Central Terminal, a historic landmark.79 The
Preservation Commission denied Penn Central’s request, stating, “To
protect a Landmark, one does not tear it down. To perpetuate its
architectural features, one does not strip them off.”80 Penn Central brought
suit, alleging an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.81
The Court analyzed whether the State exceeded its police power by
enacting the Preservation Law.82 In doing so, the Supreme Court considered
three factors: (1) economic impact, (2) investment-backed expectations, and
(3) the character of the governmental action.83 The Court balanced these
factors to assess whether the Preservation Law resulted in a taking that
required just compensation, declaratory relief, or both.84

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Koontz, 570 U.S. at 623–24 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 116. Penn Central Transportation Company owns Grand Central Terminal.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 144 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 128–29.
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First, under economic impact, the Court assessed the total amount of
loss over the parcel as a whole.85 Second, under investment-backed interest,
the Court looked to the idea of reasonable return.86 If the property could
continue to operate as it historically had, then the property could likely
achieve a reasonable return on its investment.87 Third, the Court reviewed
the character of the governmental action on a sliding scale.88 Meaning, if
the government’s action results in a physical invasion of the land, then there
is most likely a taking.89 A physical invasion of land, such as an easement,
deprives the landowner of certain property rights.90
In assessing economic impact, Penn Central argued that the
Preservation Law effectively deprived them of any use right within the
airspace over the train station.91 The Court reasoned that, although the use
right may have been removed from the area directly over the station, it was
not denied from the eight other parcels owned by Penn Central within the
vicinity of the train station.92 Viewing the parcel as a whole, the prohibited
use of airspace over one parcel out of nine weighed against a taking
requiring just compensation.93 As for investment-backed expectations, the
Preservation Law did not interfere with the use of Grand Central as a train
station, and thus the law did not interfere with Penn Central’s primary
expectation to use the parcel for a train station.94 In addition, because New
York City did not impose a permanent physical invasion on Penn Central’s
land, the character of the governmental action weighed against a taking
requiring just compensation.95 The Court reasoned that “the government
may execute laws or programs that adversely affect recognized economic
values.”96 Economic deprivation alone is typically not enough to weigh in
favor of a taking.97

85. Id. at 130–31.
86. Id. at 136.
87. Id. at 136–37.
88. Id. at 124.
89. Id. at 128–29. As stated above, a monetary exaction, rather than a physical exaction,
occurred in Koontz. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 629 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting). Moreover, the monetary exaction did not interfere with the owner’s
possessory interests. Id. at 629–30.
90. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 451 (1982).
91. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 136.
95. Id. at 124–26 (citing examples).
96. Id. at 124.
97. Id. at 124–25.
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The holding in Penn Central has since been elaborated upon in Loretto
and Lucas. The Court’s holding in Loretto reinforced that a law that
imposes a physical invasion is often a per se taking.98 In Lucas, focusing
on the economic impact factor, the Supreme Court recognized that a total
taking—meaning a total economic deprivation of value—may exist.99 In
that situation, the land is rendered completely valueless to the market, and
a taking without just compensation may only be permissible if the proposed
use is a common law nuisance.100
In Loretto, a New York statute required that property owners allow a
television company to install cables on the property.101 The owner of a
rental building sued the television company, claiming the installation was a
taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.102 The Supreme Court
agreed.103 The Court affirmed “the traditional rule that a permanent
physical occupation of property is a taking.”104 The cable’s presence on the
building, although small, was a permanent physical invasion that deprived
the owner of property rights.105 As a result, the state could not impose the
burden without just compensation.106
In Lucas, an individual bought two residential lots on a South Carolina
barrier island to build single-family homes.107 Two years after the purchase,
the state enacted the Beachfront Management Act (Act), which barred the
petitioner from building any permanent habitable structure on the parcels.108
The Act was intended to prevent further erosion of coastal areas in South
Carolina.109 The Supreme Court, despite reservations from dissenting
justices, accepted the trial court’s finding that the Act rendered the owner’s
land completely valueless.110 In order to justify the Act, the State was
required to show that the owner’s interest in building single-family homes
was a common law nuisance.111 A nuisance is not a legally protected use

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030–32 (1992).
Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 423.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id. at 437–38.
Id. at 441.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07 (1992).
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1009–10.
Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1031.
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right.112 The Court reasoned that if the owner’s proposed use is a nuisance,
then it is a use right that was never part of his title.113 Because an individual
cannot be deprived of a right that she never had, it is not a taking.114 The
decision in Lucas determined that, even though a law renders a parcel
valueless, it may be constitutional if the owner’s use is a common law
nuisance.115
The decisions in Penn Central, Loretto, and Lucas established an
analytical framework to help assess if and when land-use regulations go
beyond the constitutional use of police power and result in a taking.116 The
framework is defined by three questions.117 First, is there a permanent
physical invasion?118 If yes, the analysis ends and there is a per se taking.119
If no, has the regulation totally deprived the owner of economically viable
use?120 If yes, the analysis ends and there is a per se taking.121 If no, after
balancing economic impact, investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the governmental action, do the facts weigh in favor of finding
a per se taking?122
The Penn Central analysis, supported by the holdings in Loretto and
Lucas, is the appropriate framework for assessing when a regulation,
created in pursuit of the health, safety, and welfare of the public, goes too
far as to impede upon an individual’s constitutionally protected property
rights.123
112. Id. at 1029–30.
113. Id. (“Such regulatory action may well have the effect of eliminating the land’s only
economically productive use, but it does not proscribe a productive use that was previously
permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles. The use of these properties for
what are now expressly prohibited purposes was always unlawful . . . .”).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Michael B. Kent, Jr., More Questions than Answers: Situating Judicial Takings
within Existing Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 29 VA. ENV’T L.J. 143, 148–50 (2011).
117. Id. at 149.
118. Id. “Property rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights ‘to possess,
use and dispose of it.’” Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)). “To the extent that the government permanently occupies
physical property, it effectively destroys each of these rights.” Id.
119. Kent, Jr., supra note 116, at 162.
120. See id. Total deprivation of economically viable use renders the parcel valueless.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992).
121. Kent, Jr., supra note 116, at 162.
122. See generally id. at 163–66.
123. The dissent in Koontz signals that a monetary demand does not fall into the category
of a condition precedent or subsequent in need of analysis under Nollan and Dolan. Rather,
it requires analysis under a due process or Penn Central framework. See Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 629 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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II. A PATH FORWARD FOR INCLUSIONARY ZONING
A. Empowering Local Governments to Provide for Affordable Housing
A monetary exaction may be imposed prior to the approval of a
building permit to benefit any number of social issues, whether it be the
conservation of wetlands or providing affordable housing. States have the
power to enact laws to benefit the health, safety, and welfare of the
community.124 Florida exercised this power by enforcing a monetary
exaction, requiring conservation easements, or modifying building plans on
all new developments in order to mitigate wetland destruction.125 The state
likely reasoned that each new development on Florida’s wetlands
threatened the health, safety, and welfare of the community because surface
water may be contaminated or natural habitats may be destroyed.126
Similarly, a state may exercise this power by enforcing a monetary
exaction on all new residential-building developments in order to provide
affordable housing. The state could reason that each new residential
building impacts the health, safety, and welfare of the community because
it limits the supply of affordable housing.127 If such development continues
unabated, lower-income residents would be deprived of affordable housing
options.
Although wetland conservation and affordable housing are distinct
social issues, they may share a common solution. The monetary exaction
imposed on the developer in Koontz is directly analogous to a monetary
exaction that could be imposed on housing developers.128 Just as the
developer in Koontz was required to fund projects to assist in the
preservation of wetlands, a private developer could be required to fund
projects to assist in the construction of affordable housing.129 Similarly, just
as a private developer could be required to limit the size of the construction
to protect wetlands, so too could a developer be asked to modify his or her

124. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”).
125. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 600–01.
126. See id.
127. See Diana Olick, Rents Are Rising at the Fastest Pace in Almost Two Years, CNBC
(Mar. 22, 2018, 1:28 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/22/rents-are-rising-at-the-fastestpace-in-almost-two-years.html [https://perma.cc/8BZR-5F22].
128. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 600–02.
129. Id. at 601–02.
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construction plan, in exchange for a reciprocal benefit, to provide a set
number of affordable housing units.130
The dissent’s discussion in Koontz provides an opportunity for North
Carolina, and other states across the country, to empower local governments
to solve any number of social issues that threaten the health, safety, and
welfare of a community. Because a monetary exaction does not deprive the
owner of a use right, it does not result in a taking in need of just
compensation.131
B. Applying Koontz to the Penn Central Factor Balance
A monetary exaction imposed to resolve a social issue that impacts the
health, safety, and welfare of a community is constitutional. The primary
issue in Koontz was whether the monetary exaction was a condition
requiring a takings analysis or was a regulation that threatened to exceed
the local police power.132 The Supreme Court previously held that a
requirement to pay money does not require a takings analysis.133 The
payment of money does not alter a specific and identified property interest,
such as use or exclusive possession.134 Understanding this fact to be true, it
is likely that the dissent in Koontz would have become the majority.135
This is reinforced by applying the facts in Koontz to the analytical
framework that summarizes the holdings of Penn Central, Loretto, and
Lucas.
The first question is whether there is a permanent physical invasion.136
Unlike the building owner in Loretto, the property owner in Koontz did not
experience a permanent physical invasion.137 “Koontz claims that the

130. Id.
131. Id. at 623 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 608–09.
133. Id. at 623–24 (majority opinion) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he law did not effect a
taking because it did not ‘operate upon or alter’ a ‘specific and identified propert[y] or
property right[].’ Instead, ‘[t]he law simply imposes an obligation to perform an act, the
payment of benefits. The statute is indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to comply
or the property it uses to do so.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 540–41 (1998)).
134. Id. at 623 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
135. See id. (“[D]oes requiring a person to pay money to the government, or spend money
on its behalf, constitute a taking requiring just compensation? Only if the answer is yes does
the Nollan-Dolan test apply.”).
136. Kent, Jr., supra note 116, at 161.
137. See Koontz, 570 U.S. at 621 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[N]o taking occurred in this
case because Koontz never acceded to a demand (even had there been one), and so no
property changed hands . . . .”). The holding in Loretto reaffirmed the reasoning in Penn
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District demanded that he spend money to improve public wetlands, not that
he hand over a real property interest.”138 Mr. Koontz held every stick in the
bundle of his property rights at the time he brought his claim. Therefore, it
cannot be said that he suffered a permanent physical invasion requiring just
compensation.139
The second question is whether there was total economic
deprivation.140 Unlike the barrier island landowner in Lucas, the property
owner in Koontz was not totally deprived of all economically viable use.141
The district was willing to approve the development of 3.7 acres of land if
Mr. Koontz agreed to fund mitigation projects to offset the damage of the
construction.142 Mr. Koontz retained the right to build on his land.143
Therefore, it cannot be said that he was deprived of all economically viable
use as to render his land valueless.
The third question is whether economic impact, investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action weigh in favor
of a taking.144 First, economic impact is assessed based on the amount of
loss over the value of the parcel as a whole.145 Mr. Koontz, having not
agreed to any of the demands presented by the district, continued to hold
the full value and rights in the parcel.146 At a minimum, he was permitted
to develop 3.7 acres of land.147 His only potential loss was the money spent
to fund the mitigation projects to assist in wetland conservation.148 If this

Central that a permanent physical invasion likely constitutes a per se taking in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982).
138. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 623 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
139. In Loretto, the Supreme Court held that the presence of cable equipment on the
landowner’s property was a permanent physical invasion that deprived him of his use right
over a portion of his parcel. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421. Unlike the landowner in Loretto, the
district in Koontz did not physically invade any portion of the petitioner’s land. Koontz, 570
U.S. at 600–02. Rather, the district requested the payment of a benefit for land completely
unconnected to Mr. Koontz’s parcel. Id.
140. Kent, Jr., supra note 116, at 162.
141. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 601–02 (noting that under the district’s proposed exactions to
help mitigate the environmental harm Mr. Koontz’s construction would impose, Mr. Koontz
retained 3.7 acres to construct upon as he wished).
142. Id. at 602.
143. Id.
144. Kent, Jr., supra note 116, at 163.
145. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
146. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 600–02.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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amount is less than the overall value of the parcel as a whole, then this factor
weighs against a taking.149
Second, as for the investment-backed interest, Mr. Koontz purchased
the land undeveloped.150 After owning the land for twenty-two years, he
applied for a building permit.151 Mr. Koontz purchased the land as
undeveloped and the land continued to be undeveloped.152 Therefore, his
investment-backed interest weighs against a taking.
Third, as for the character of the governmental action, the regulation
was created for the preservation of wetlands to benefit the health of the
general public.153 The government did not permanently deprive Mr. Koontz
of his land, but simply required that he assist in funding projects to help
mitigate the damage of the construction.154 Therefore, under the Penn
Central framework, Florida lawfully exercised its police power by requiring
the petitioner to pay funds to assist in the conservation of wetlands.
In summary, a fee that mitigates the harmful effects of development is
not a taking because the owner is not deprived of any of her property
interest. She continues to hold every stick in her bundle of property rights.
The majority in Koontz erred by viewing the monetary exaction as a
deprivation of property interests.155 By doing so, the Court improperly
applied the “rough proportionality” and “nexus” tests from Nollan and
Dolan.156 Because no property interests are affected by imposing a
monetary exaction, an alternative analysis must be applied, specifically, the
above-mentioned framework established by the holdings in Penn Central,
Loretto, and Lucas. In doing so, the Court may determine on a case-by-case
basis if the monetary exaction is a regulation that exceeds the state’s police
power.157 Based on the application of this framework to the facts in Koontz,
a monetary exaction is not a constitutional taking.
Therefore, a monetary exaction imposed on a private developer
provides a constitutional way to allow local governments to address social

149. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 137.
150. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 599.
151. Id. at 601.
152. Id. at 600–01.
153. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (stating that a taking is more
readily found in a physical invasion than “when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”).
154. See, e.g., id. (“[The] government may execute laws or programs that adversely affect
recognized economic values.”).
155. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 623–24 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 633, 635–36 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 629 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2021

19

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 4

394

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:375

issues, such as affordable housing. The question then becomes: What is the
best statutory framework to resolve this social issue?
III. HOW CAN NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONALLY PROVIDE FOR
AFFORDABLE HOUSING?
A. What Work is Already Being Done
Towns in North Carolina have begun the process of incorporating
affordable housing policies into local zoning ordinances. In 2001,
Davidson, North Carolina, enacted a mandatory inclusionary zoning
ordinance.158 The ordinance applies “to all new developments that result in
or contain two (2) or more residential lots of dwelling units . . . .” 159
“Developments with 7 or fewer residential units must either provide one
affordable unit or make a payment in lieu to the Town.”160 Developments
with “8 or more [residential] units” must provide 12.5% of all units at a
below market rate.161 In 2014, two developers challenged the legality of
this ordinance.162 The developers alleged that Davidson exceeded its power
granted by the North Carolina General Assembly.163 The parties settled
before any legal conclusions were made.164 As of 2020, the Ordinance has
provided 145 affordable housing units in Davidson.165
In 2010, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, enacted a mandatory
inclusionary zoning ordinance.166
The ordinance “applies to all
development . . . [with] at least 5 single-family dwelling units.”167
Depending on the zoning of the new development, a developer may be
required to set aside 10–15% of all units for a below market rate.168
Developers required to set aside 15% of units may receive up to a 15%

158. DAVIDSON, N.C. PLANNING ORDINANCE § 5.1–.5 (2015).
159. Id. § 5.2.
160. Id. § 5.2(A)(1).
161. Id. § 5.2(A)(2).
162. Marusak, supra note 13.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. § 5.1–.5; Affordable Housing in Davidson, AFFORDABLE HOUS. ONLINE,
https://affordablehousingonline.com/housing-search/North-Carolina/Davidson [https://per
ma.cc/R6CY-CNVH].
166. Chapel Hill, N.C., Ordinance 2010-06-21/O-11 (June 21, 2010).
167. Id. § 3.10.1(a)(1).
168. Id. § 3.10.2(a).
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density bonus, with some exceptions.169 In lieu of providing units at
below-market rates, the Planning Board may allow the developer to provide
a land dedication, existing unit dedication, offsite construction, a payment
to fund affordable housing projects, or an alternative proposed by the
developer.170 There are currently 336 affordable housing units in Chapel
Hill.171
As of 2016, “inclusionary zoning laws existed in 886 jurisdictions”
within twenty-five states and the District of Columbia.172 Washington,
D.C., Maryland, and Virginia reflect different approaches to the same social
issue and offer valuable case studies for states hoping to adopt similar
policies.
In Washington, D.C. below-market rate (BMR) units became available
in 2011.173 D.C.’s policy “applies to residential projects of 10 units or more,
and requires that 8 to 10 percent of the project square footage (not unit
count) be designated as BMR housing.”174 In exchange, “developers can
receive up to a 20 percent increase in density over the set zoning.”175 “The
price of the BMR units is set to 80 percent of the area median income for
for sale units, and 60 percent AMI for rental units.”176 As of 2016, there
were 402 BMR units in the District of Columbia.177
Montgomery County’s Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit (MPDU)
program applies to development with 20 or more units.178 The program
169. Id. A density bonus is “the maximum number of dwelling units approved in the
zoning district.” Id. § 3.10.2(d)(1).
170. Id. § 3.10.3(d)(1)–(4).
171. See TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL OFF. FOR HOUS. & CMTY., AFFORDABLE HOUSING
ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2020).
172. Benjamin Schneider, CityLab University: Inclusionary Zoning, BLOOMBERG
CITYLAB (Jul. 17, 2018, 4:15 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/07/citylabuniversity-inclusionary-zoning/565181/[https://perma.cc/R53Y-YBXZ].
173. Id. Below-market rate denotes rental properties that are offered for a rental price
below the market’s average rental price.
174. Id.
175. Id. Cities and towns are typically controlled by a series of zoning ordinances. See
Michael Chandler & Gregory Dale, Zoning Basics, 42 PLAN. COMM’RS J. 13, 13–14 (2001).
At a minimum, these ordinances divide an area into several zoning districts for residential,
commercial, or industry use. Id. at 16. To help regulate population and area density, the
ordinance may provide stipulations that a residential building within the zone may not have
more than 100 units. This is the set density for that zone.
176. Schneider, supra note 172.
177. Id.
178. Case Study of Long-Term Program Contributes to Understanding of Inclusionary
Zoning, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL. (Jan. 18, 2013), https://nlihc.org/resource/casestudy-long-term-programs-contributes-understanding-inclusionary-zoning [https://perma.c
c/FT3G-SG3R] [hereinafter Case Study of Long-Term Program].
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requires “12.5 and 15 percent of the total number of units in every
subdivision or high-rise building of 20 or more units” to be “moderately
priced.”179 As of October 31, 2018, “developments with less than 20 but
more than 10 units are required to make a payment to the Housing Initiative
Fund in lieu of an MPDU requirement on-site.”180 Individuals earning a
minimum of “$30,000 to a maximum of $81,500” may qualify to rent or
purchase a MPDU unit.181 The program has created approximately 13,000
units at an average rate of 368 units per year.182
Fairfax County’s Affordable Dwelling Unit (ADU) program applies to
developments with at least 50 units.183 The program requires that one-third
of rental units “be reserved for households that make 50% [AMI] or less,
while all for-sale and the remaining two-thirds of rental ADUs must go to
households with incomes of 70% AMI or less.”184 The program has created
approximately 2,448 units at an average rate of 122 units per year.185
B. Statutory Language that Complies with Penn Central?
There is no uniform way to impose inclusionary zoning policies.
Below is recommended language to assist local governments in North
Carolina to enact inclusionary zoning policies. The provisions are written
to avoid a taking as defined in Penn Central, Loretto, and Lucas. This
recommended language is dependent on expanding the definition of “use”
under North Carolina’s general zoning power to explicitly permit
inclusionary zoning policies for affordable housing.186 Interwoven with the
bolded statutory provisions are brief explanations of each specific
provision’s purpose and constitutionality.
Prior to the approval of any building permit that authorizes the
construction of residential units, all private developers who propose the
construction of eight or more units187 in [City, Town, County] are
179. Housing, MONTGOMERY PLAN., https://montgomeryplanning.org/planning/housing/
[https://perma.cc/9GCC-NMWM] (last updated Mar. 25, 2020).
180. Id.
181. Case Study of Long-Term Program, supra note 178.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See N.C. Gᴇɴ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 160A-381 (2019), 153A-340 (2019).
187. DAVIDSON, N.C. PLANNING ORDINANCE § 5.1–.5 (2015) (noting that
“[d]evelopments with 7 or fewer residential units must either provide one affordable unit or
make a payment in lieu to the Town,” and that “[d]evelopments with 8 or more units shall
provide all required affordable units in accordance with Section 5.2”).
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hereby required to reserve ten percent188 of all residential units for
tenants with eighty percent or less area median income (AMI). 189

The requirement of eight or more units ensures that the financial
impact of requiring developers to charge a below-market rate on a
percentage of units minimally impacts the developer’s projected profits.
Individuals opposed to inclusionary zoning may argue that this
provision is a permanent physical invasion. But the government is not
denying the developer a right to exclusive possession of its land or any
rights to the property. Instead, the provision merely places a regulation on
the use of a parcel for the benefit of the public. This is directly analogous
to the development restrictions imposed in Penn Central.190 There, the
property owner was not permitted to develop the airspace above Grand
Central Terminal because of the city’s interest in preserving historical
landmarks.191 The Court held that this was permissible by viewing the
parcel as a whole.192 The restriction on development in Penn Central was
on one parcel out of nine.193 Here, viewing the parcel as a whole, only 10%
of the total development is impacted. Therefore, a court will likely find that
this is a permissible restriction on private development.
Developers that reserve ten percent or more of all residential units for
individuals with eighty percent or less AMI will qualify for ten percent
more density over the set zoning. 194

188. Id. § 5.2(C)(1) (requiring “12.5% of the total number of residential units within any
development shall be affordable housing units and shall be located on the site of the
development.”); Chapel Hill, N.C., Ordinance 2010-06-21/O-11 (June 21, 2010) (requiring
developments of five or more units to provide 15% of their units at prices affordable to
low- and moderate-income households”).
189. DAVIDSON, N.C. PLANNING ORDINANCE § 5.2(C)(2), Table 5–1 (requiring that
12.5% of affordable housing units 30%–100% must be reserved for tenants with less than
50% AMI, 0%–70% must be reserved for tenants with between 50%–80% AMI, and 0%–
20% must be reserved for tenants with between 80%–120% AMI).
190. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
191. Id. at 117–18.
192. Id. at 130–31. Viewing the affected parcels as a whole—that is, nine separate
parcels with a restriction imposed on one—the Court held that this factor did not weigh in
favor of taking. Similarly, when assessing a residential development as a whole, limiting
the use of 10% does not weigh in favor of a taking.
193. Id. at 137.
194. DAVIDSON, N.C. PLANNING ORDINANCE §§ 5.2(C)(3) (“Affordable units do not count
towards maximum density standards . . . .”).
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If the developer is able to build more units than were originally
permitted, then there will automatically be a more favorable profit calculus.
For example, if the original set density is sixty units, and the private
developer is required to reserve 10% of those units—here six units—at
below-market rates, increasing the set area density allows the developer to
make the same projected profit, and slightly more, while still providing
affordable housing.
This provision further ensures that there is not a permanent physical
invasion and that developers’ investment-backed interests are preserved.195
A set density increase provides additional units that the developer would
not have been permitted to construct. Therefore, it cannot be a permanent
physical invasion. A person cannot claim a taking of property that he or she
would not have been permitted to possess in the first instance.196 Also, the
set density increase ensures that the developer’s profitability is not reduced
and that the cost of providing for affordable housing is not passed on to
renters paying the full market price.
Alternatively, the [Town, City, or County] “may approve one or more
of the following options”197 in lieu of setting aside affordable housing
units. First, the developer may dedicate land to the [Town, City, or
County].198 Second, the developer may provide payment in lieu of
setting aside the required units for affordable housing “if . . . the
payment provides opportunity for an equivalent or greater amount of
Affordable Dwelling Units.” 199 “The per unit average of the subsidies
will be calculated, and this average will be multiplied by the average
percent increase in the cost of new homes constructed in the Town[,
City, or County] for that fiscal year. The result will be the payment in
lieu fee for the coming year.”200 The [Town, City, or County] “shall
annually establish the per unit payment amount.”201 “The payment
shall be made to the Town[, City, or County] and reserved to be used
for affordable housing purposes.”202 Third, the developer may propose
an alternative plan to provide for affordable housing subject to the
approval of the proper zoning authority.

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 127.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030–32 (1992).
Chapel Hill, N.C., Ordinance 2010-06-21/O-11 § 3.10.3(d) (June 21, 2010).
Id. § 3.10.3(d)(1).
Id. § 3.10.3(d)(4)(B).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 3.10.3(d)(4)(C).
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Rather than reserving a set number of below-market units, this option
allows a developer to dedicate land, make an annual payment to assist in
affordable housing projects, or propose an alternative plan. Furthermore,
this provision safeguards against a constitutional challenge. Even if a court
were to apply the Nollan and Dolan test to the monetary exaction “so long
as a permitting authority offers the landowner at least one alternative [to the
monetary exaction] that would satisfy Nollan and Dolan, the landowner has
not been subjected to an unconstitutional condition.”203
Projects funded by payment in lieu of setting aside affordable housing
units must include housing projects for individuals with eighty percent
or less AMI, financial assistance to private developers constructing
housing for renters with eighty percent or less AMI, or financial
assistance to existing owners or developers that convert ten percent or
more of existing units to affordable housing for individuals with eighty
percent or less AMI.

This provision ensures that the funds collected are used to support
individuals in need of affordable housing. The state may also elect to use
the funds to encourage private developers to construct affordable housing
units. Encouragement may come in the form of grants or planned housing
projects to assist in the cost of construction. This creates a new market of
development and an opportunity for private businesses to profit.
Residential developments that set aside ten percent or more of units for
affordable housing must require households to sign one-year leases and
to certify every three years204 that they remain below the designated
income threshold.

Housing stability provides greater opportunities for families to
increase their income because it allows them to focus on work without the
fear of losing their home. Yearly income certification discourages families
from increasing their income. Income certification every three years
provides families with the opportunity to increase their income and prepare
to move to a market-rate unit or purchase a home all while benefiting from
the stability provided by an affordable home.
203. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 611.
204. DAVIDSON, N.C. PLANNING ORDINANCE § 5.5(A)(2) (2015) (“The Town shall adopt
and review, at least every three years, asset limitations.”); see also § 5.5(C)(4) (“Rents
charged for an affordable unit must not exceed the rental rate limitations published annually
by HUD . . . .”).
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The phasing,205 style,206 quality,207 size,208 and location209 of affordable
housing units must be equivalent or functionally equivalent210 to
market rate units.

This provision ensures equality between market rate and below market
rate units.
Residents who meet the required AMI limit shall not be denied
residence based on prior eviction records.

A single instance of an eviction or an eviction filing can detrimentally
impact an individual’s ability to find a new rental unit.211 As a result,
individuals are typically forced to rent unsafe and overpriced units from
landowners who are willing to overlook their eviction records.212 This often
results in a subsequent eviction because the rent is unaffordable.213 By
excluding eviction records from a resident’s application for a below-market
rate unit, this policy does not perpetuate the cycle of eviction.
CONCLUSION
Evictions systematically invite instability into every aspect of daily
life. Children are uprooted from schools because their parents are no longer
able to rent a home in that district. Parents are fired from jobs because they

205. § 5.3(A)(7).
206. Chapel Hill, N.C., Ordinance 2010-06-21/O-11 § 3.10.7(c) (“The exterior
appearance of the affordable housing units in any development subject to these regulations
shall be compatible in style and quality with the market rate units in the development, subject
to Town Manager approval.”).
207. Id.
208. Id. § 3.10.7(d) (“The affordable housing units shall have a number of bedrooms in
the . . . same proportion as the market rate units.”)
209. Id. § 3.10.7(a) (“Affordable housing units or lots shall be located within the
development subject to these regulations . . . .”).
210. DAVIDSON, N.C. PLANNING ORDINANCE § 5.5(A)(1) (“Affordable units shall be
‘functionally equivalent’ to market rate units.”).
211. DESMOND, supra note 11, at 297 (pointing out that many public housing authorities
consider evictions when evaluation eligibility for benefits, resulting in denials of benefits to
those who most need it).
212. Id. (“These families are often compelled to accept substandard housing
conditions.”); see also id. at 351–52 nn.1–2.
213. Id. at 297.
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take days off to find patchwork solutions to avoid homelessness.
COVID-19 forced policymakers to acknowledge the impact of evictions on
vulnerable populations. However, as eviction moratoria lift, the light is
once again fading on efforts to end the eviction cycle for the 171 families
that are evicted every day in North Carolina.214 Before the light goes out,
North Carolina needs a long-term solution. The best solution is expanding
North Carolina’s general zoning power to explicitly permit inclusionary
zoning policies that provide for affordable housing and empowering local
governments to enact these policies if it will benefit their communities.
Rebecca K Skahen*

214. North Carolina Data, EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/map/#/2016?geograph
y=states&bounds=-190.672,5.659,-44.648,65.839&type=er&locations=37,-79.374,35.533
[https://perma.cc/6TQ8-UQHE].
*
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